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DISABILITY OF PARTNER OR JOINT ADVENTURER TO TAKE RENEWAL
OF FIRM LEASE
The close scrutiny which the courts give to the conduct of fidu-
ciaries is exemplified in the numerous cases in which fiduciaries
have attempted to renew in their own names leases in which they
were interested in their fiduciary capacity. The leading case on
[ 782 ]
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the general subject, Keech v. Sandford,1 involved a renewal by
an infant's trustee, after the lessor had refused to renew to the
infant. Lord Chancellor King stated, in his oft quoted opinion:
"I must consider this as a trust for the infant; for I may well
see, if a trustee, on the refusal to renew, might have a lease to
himself, few trust-estates would be renewed to cestui que use;
though I do not say there is a fraud in this case, yet he should
rather have let it run out, than to have had the lease to himself.
This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only person of all
mankind who might not have the lease: but it is very proper that
the rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed;
for it is very obvious what would be the consequence of letting
trustees have the lease, on refusal to renew to cestui que use."
The theory of this case has been applied to various fiduciary
relationships.2 Its applicability to partnerships was definitely
decided in Featherstonhavgh v. Fewick,3 where a partner had
secretly taken a renewal of the partnership lease and subse-
quently exercised his power of dissolving the partnership by
notice. Later cases decided that the disability of the partner
existed even where the partnership contract fixed a definite
period of duration and the renewal was to commence after that
period had come to an end; - where the partners had quarrelled,
making dissolution inevitable; 5 or where the partnership had
already been dissolved at the time the renewal was takenG It
has been held immaterial that the new lease prohibited assign-
ment without the consent of the lessor.7  The disability applies
to the representatives of a deceased partner; 8 and to a surviving
partner.- But the claim may be barred by laches; "I and, seem-
1 Select cases in Chancery 61, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726).
2 Holt v. Holt, 1 Cas. Ch. 190 (1671) (executor); Robinson v. Jewett,
116 N. Y. 40, 22 N. E. 224 (1889) (director of corporation); Gower v.
Andrew, 59 Cal. 119 (1881) (confidential clerk); Davis v. Hamlin, 103
Ill. 39 (1883) (manager of theatre); Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444 (1809)
(managing agent); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 123 Misc. 704, 206 N. Y. Supp.
134 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (employee-relative) ; Turner v. Fryberger, 94 Minn. 433,
103 N. W. 217 (1905) (attorney of administrator). See, generally, note in 2
WHrrE & TuDOn, LEADING CAsEs IN EQmTY (8th ed. 1912) 707; Note (1907)
7 ANN. CAS. 297.
3 17 Ves. 298 (1810).
4 Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123 (1874), 84 N. Y. 550 (1881).
5 Knapp v. Reed, 88 Neb. 754, 130 N. W. 430, 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 869
(1911).
6 Johnson's Appeal, 115 Pa. 129, 8 Atl. 36 (1886) ; Spiess v. Rossv,og, 63
How. Pr. 401 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1882), aff'd, 96 N. Y. 651 (1834).
7 Ladas v. Psiharis, 241 Mlich. 101, 216 N. W. 458 (1927); ef. O'Brien v.
Egan, 5 L. R. Ir. 633 (1880) (renewal by life-tenant held to inure to
benefit of remainderman).
sAlder v. Fouracre, 3 Swans. 489 (1818).
9 Clements v. Hall, 2 DeG. & J. 173 (1857).
1o Clegg v. Edmondson, 8 DeG. M. & G. 787 (1857); ef. Clements v.
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ingly, conduct subsequent to knowledge of the renewal may be
interpreted as a waiver of the power of compelling an interest
in the new lease.1 The fact that a third person is a party to
the renewal seems immaterial where he had notice of the facts.1
Relief in the form of a declaration of trust, an accounting for
the value of the lease, or an injunction 13 against the use of
the lease for other than partnership purposes appear to be
equally available. 14
An examination of the facts of the cases reveals elements of
fraud in some instances, as where the renewing partner deliber-
ately allowed the old lease to lapse, though he was relied upon
to make the payments; 11 where the partner took the renewal
after he had agreed to renew in the name of the partnership; 10
where the partner without authority surrendered the old lease
and took the new one; 17 where the partner secretly cancelled
the old lease and renewed to himself.' s It is clear, however, that
these elements of fraud are unnecessary; that secrecy in the
transaction is sufficient to invoke the operation of the rule.10 It
would iot have been strange if the courts had made the result
of each case depend upon whether, in the light of all the circum-
stances, the particular transaction was unfair or unethical. But
it has evidently been deemed more desirable to have a more
rigid standard; to err on the side of requiring too much rather
than too little of a fiduciary.20 The requirement of frank dis-
closure does not seem unreasonable.
Hall, supra note 9. These cases indicate that the courts will not permit a
partner to tdke an unfair advantage of the rule by lying by until it is
certain that the venture is a success.
1 Cf. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E.
378 (1919) (principal-agent case); Sandy River R. R. v. Stubbs, '77
Me. 594, 2 Atl. 9 (1885) (case of director of corporation).
12 Cf. Gower v. Andrew, supra note 2 (case of confidential clerk).
's Alder v. Fouracre, supra note 8 (injunction granted against use for
other than partnership purposes; but court refused to enjoin lessor from
making the renewal).
14 But in Browne v. Scull, 27 Pa. Super. 513 (1905), where a declaration
of trust was denied, the court implied that it would have granted an
'accounting.
15 Hollowell v. Satterfield, 185 Ky. 397, 215 S. W. 63 (1919).
loLurie v. Pinanski, 215 Mass. 229, 102 N. E. 629 (1913),
17 Palmer v. Young, 1 Vern. 276 (1684).
IsSneed v. Deal, 53 Ark. 152, 13 S. W. 703 (1890).
19 In most of the cases cited supra notes 3 to 15, the element of secrecy
alone was sufficiently operative.
20 Compare the -language of Cardozo, J. in connection with a similar
problem of fiduciary conduct in Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 443,
154 N. E. 303, 304 (1926): "The law 'does not stop to inquire whether
the contract or transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when
the relation is disclosed... I Only by this uncompromising rigidity has
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Whether a full disclosure will remove the partner's disability
is not clear. The cases in which secrecy is involved generally
stress that fact and imply that a different result might be
reached if that element were not present. 1 But in the case of
Clegg v. Ed-mondson,22 it was held that "mere communication
of the intention on the part of the managing partners to apply
for the new lease for their own benefit" would not prevent the
renewal from being impressed with a trust. In tlis case the
partners who renewed were the managing partners of a mine,
and the court felt that despite the notification the other partners
were not on an equal footing as to the opportunity of taking ad-
vantage of the possibility of renewal. The case has been criticized
as carrying the rule too far,23 and of the few cases which involve
a renewal without any secrecy several have reached a contrary
result on the ground that the purpose of the rule is satisfied
where the partner acts openly in the transaction. "
It is frequently said that the disability with respect to renewal
does not apply to a purchase by a partner of the reversion.-21
The strongest case observing this distinction is Bcvan v. Wcbb.-G
The court bases the distinction on the ground that the reversion
is not, like a renewal, "a graft upon the old stock." This argu-
ment will bear some analysis. Calling the renewal a graft upon
the old stock indicates that the renewal is regarded as partner-
ship property, like an increase of livestock; so that when the
partner takes the renewal to himself he is appropriating a
partnership asset. Strictly speaking, however, it is clear that
the asset of the partnership consists in its expectancy of renewal
rather than in the renewal itself. The purchase of the reversion
would seem to deprive the firm of this expectancy quite as effec-
tively as a renewal. The identification of the renewal and the
expectancy is probably traceable to the fact that ancient agri-
cultural leases, whether held from colleges, ecclesiastical bodies,
the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained against disintegrating
erosion."
21 Thus it was said in Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, supra note 3, at 312:
"They ought first to have given him notice and to have placed him on
equal terms with them; and then, if Mir. W. had thought proper to give
them the preference, the case might admit of a different construction."
22Supra note 10. In this case the claim was held barred by lachcs.
231 ROWL=Y, MODERN LAW OF PART.NERSHiP (1916) 467.
24 Chittenden v. Witbeck, 50 Mich. 401, 15 N. W. 520 (1883); Tygart v.
Wilson, 39 App. Div. 58, 56 N. Y. Supp. 827 (3d Dep't 1899). A fortiori
where the lessor had refused to renew to the firm. Jacksonville Cigar Co.
v. Dozier, 53 Fla. 1059, 43 So. 523 (1907) (case of director of corporation).
- See Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y. 236, 237 (1853).
26 [1905] 1 Ch. 620. Accord: Donleavey v. Johnston, 24 Cal. App. 310.
141 Pac. 229 (1914); Batchelor v. Whitaker, 88 N. C. 350 (18S3); see
Griffith v. Owen, [1907] 1 Ch. 195, 204.
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or private persons, were renewable by custom as a matter of
course.27 The modern lessor of urban property feels no such
obligation to renew to his tenant. It is not so close to the facts
today to say that when the partner takes the renewal he is
appropriating a partnership asset. It is believed that the true
basis for the disability of the partner to renew to himself, as
brought out in the cases, is not that he is taking property from
the firm but that his actions do not conform to the standard
required of one in the position of trust and confidence which a
partner occupies.28  From this point of view the conduct of
the partner is judged by the broad test ofwhether it is the
type of conduct which the courts may safely sanction in a
partner rather than by the narrower test of whether the interest
obtained was a "graft upon the old stock." The distinction
made as to the purchase of the reversion then becomes very
doubtful. On this basis the rule of Bevan v. Webb was repudi-
ated by a New York court.2
A recent case 2 0 in New York, which divided the Court of
Appeals four to three, affords an interesting study since the
relationship involved was not quite a partnership and the trans-
action something more than a renewal. The facts were as fol-
lows: the defendant, a real estate dealer, leased a hotel site
for twenty years. While negotiating for the lease he had been
negotiating with the plaintiff for the necessary funds. Soon
after the lease was executed plaintiff and defendant drew up
a written agreement defining their relations in the lease. Plain-
tiff agreed to contribute half of the sums necessary for operation
and to bear half of the losses. In return plaintiff was to receive
half of the profits. The exclusive control over management and
operation was vested in the defendant. Under the defendant's
direction the venture became a great financial success. Shortly
before the expiration of the lease the lessor approached the
defendant with the proposition of a new lease to include a
large amount of adjoining property, to be developed as a single
tract. Defendant took the lease in the name of a corporation
which he owned and controlled. It was for a greatly increased
rental; required the destruction of existing buildings and the
erection of one large building; and was not assignable without
the consent of the lessor. The transaction was kept secret from
27 See 5 BACON, NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW (1813) Leases (U) * 221.
28 See Mitchell v. Reed, supra note 4, at 134; Featherstonhaugh v. Fon-
wick, upra note 3, at 312.
29 Maas v. Goldman, 122 Misc. 221, 203 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1924),
aff'd, 210 App. Div. 845, 206 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st Dep't 1924), approved
in (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 885. See criticism of Bevan v. Webb in Hart,
Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford (1905) 21 L. Q. REV 258,
30 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).
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the plaintiff who learned of the new lease only after its execution.
The plaintiff at once demanded that the lease be held in trust
and the joint venture continued. Upon refusal by the defendant,
plaintiff sued to have the trust declared. The referee found that
the original agreement did not create a partnership but that the
plaintiff, nevertheless, as "joint-adventurer" had an equitable
interest in the old lease which entitled him to a 25% interest
in the new lease.31 On cross-appeals to the Appellate Division,-
plaintiff's interest was increased to 50%. Defendant appealed.
In the Court of Appeals a bare majority, speaking through Car-
dozo, C. J., decided that plaintiff was entitled to a half interest
in the new lease.
The dissenting opinion raises several points. It is maintained,
first, that the plaintiff did not share the expectancy of renewal
since by the original agreement he was entitled only to an
interest in a twenty-year venture. This may well be disputed.
It can as reasonably be argued that one who invests heavily
for twenty years in a real estate development does not intend
or expect that at the end of the period the power of renewal,
rendered valuable by the co-operative venture, should inure
entirely to the benefit of his associate. The reasoning of Mitchell
v. Reed,3 3 to the effect that partners share the expectancy of
renewal even though the partnership articles call for a definitely
limited term, seems equally applicable here. The point made
next is that since the relationship here is not strictly a part-
nership the standard of conduct required is not so rigid as in
the partnership cases. The distinction appears unwarranted.
It may be true that the label "joint adventure" does not in
itself necessarily imply a factual relation of trust and confidence
so strong as in the normal partnership. In the instant case,
however, since the plaintiff shared in profits and losses, it was
only the fact that he did not share in "control" which prevented
him from being a "partner." 34 This allocation of entire control
to the defendant would seem to increase rather than decrease
the fiduciary element in the relation of the parties33 The dissent
finally argues that the secret purchase of the reversion by a
3' This figure was reached on the basis that the old lease in which
plaintiff had a half interest covered about half of the land included under
the new lease.
32 Meinhard v. Salmon, 223 App. Div. 663, 229 N. Y. Supp. 3,15 (lst
Dep't 1928).
3 3Supra note 4.
D4fDouglas, Vicarious Liability and AdminWtration of Risk II (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 720.
35 The majority had no difficulty in deciding that the defendant was bound
by as high a standard of conduct as a partner. Cf. Jansen v. Bellamore,
147 La. 900, 86 So. 324 (1920).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
partner is permitted; and that the facts here presented are more
closely analogous to the purchase of the reversion than to the
renewal of a lease. In contrast to this "graft upon the old
stock" argument the majority stresses the obligations which
arise out of the relation of confidence, impliedly denying the
validity of the distinction in the purchase of the reversion, and
concluding:
"A managing coadventurer appropriating the benefit of such a
lease without warning to his partner might fairly expect to be
reproached with conduct that was underhand, or lacking, to say
the least, in reasonable candor, if the partner were to surprise
him in the act of signing the new instrument. Conduct subject
to that reproach does not receive from equity a healing
benediction."
The final question raised by the case is the proportion in
which the plaintiff shall share in the new lease. The decided
cases in which the renewal included additional lands are few.
In all of them the problem of separating the old land from the
new was simple, and it was held without hesitation that the
trust extended only to the land comprised in the original lease 8
It has been intimated, ' however, that if the separation could
not fairly be made the one responsible for the "confusion" would
suffer the resulting inconvenience. In the instant case a physical
division, of the land was clearly impracticable and an accurate
division of interests on the basis of the proportional value con-
tributed by each piece of land was impossible. The final decision
seems the fairest possible solution of a difficult problem.
BANK'S PRIVILEGE TO SET OFF DEPOSITS AGAINST INSOLVENT DEBTOR
An interesting problem concerning a bank's privilege of set-off
was raised in the recent case of Kolkman v. Ma.nufacturers' Trust
Co." An insolvent New York corporation, in order to prefer the
bank to which it was indebted on unmatured promissory notes,
deposited funds making its total deposit sufficient to cover a
check which it immediately thereafter drew to the bank's order
in settlement of its indebtedness. The bank throughout was
admittedly completely ignorant of the preferential character of
the transaction. Five days later voluntary proceedings in bank-
ruptcy were instituted. The trustee in bankruptcy sued to
recover the payment as constituting a violation of section 15 of
36 Acheson v. Fair, 3 Drury & Warren 512 (1843) (case of trustee);
O'Brien v. Egan, supra note 7 (case of life-tenant).
s7 Acheson v. Fair, supra note 36, at 525.
127 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), rev'g 21 F. (2d) 760 (S. D. N. Y,
1927).
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the New York Stock Corporation Law,2 declaring invalid any
"conveyance, assignment or transfer of any property of any such
corporation!' or "any payment made, judgment suffered, lien
created, or security given by it . . when the corporation
is insolvent . . with the intent of giving a preference to
any particular creditor over other creditors of the corporation."
The striking feature of the Stock Corporation Law is that a
transfer may be declared void although the creditor had no rea-
sonable cause to believe that any preference was being effected.
On the other hand, under section 60 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act
such cause is a prerequisite to a voidable preference. The
bank relied upon this and asserted its right to set off the funds
under section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act,5 providing for a
set-off of "mutual debts and credits." The court held that the
trustee should recover so much of the deposit, made with intent
to create a preference, as was necessary to cover the check to
the bank.
Ordinarily a bank may apply a bankrupt customer's deposits
received in the usual course of business to the satisfaction of
his matured indebtedness by means of set-off.0 And this may
be done even during the four months' period prior to the filing
2 N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (Cum. Supp. 1924) c. 59.
3 Grandison v. Robertson, 231 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 2d, 191G); Baker v.
Emerson, 4 App. Div. 348, 38 N. Y. Supp. 576 (Sup. Ct. 189G).
4 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b) (192G): "and the person re-
ceiving it or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall then
have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such judgment or
transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee....1'
5 30 STAT. 565 (a) (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 108 (a) (192) : "In all cases
of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and
a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against
the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."
New York Co. Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 1'J8, 24 Sup. Ct. 199
(1903); BLACK, BANKnRUprcy (4th ed. 1926) § 634; CoLsma, BAxnupIrc
(13th ed. 1923) 1612.
When the set-off is made after the bankruptcy in accordance with scetion
68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, it will only apply as to those funds which
were on deposit at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed. Funds
later deposited, though neither party knew of the filing of the petition,
are not included. In re Michaelis & Lindeman, 190 Fed. 713 (S. D. N. Y.
1912). Trust funds may not be set off against the indebtedness of the
trustee, if the bank has knowledge of facts sufficient to put it on notice
of the cestui's interest. American Trust & Banking Co. v. Boone, 102
Ga. 202, 29 S. E. 182 (1897). Otherwise, such set-off may be made. Denton
Nat. Bank v. Kenney, 116 Md. 24, 81 Atl. 227 (1911); see Note (1925) 38
HARV. L. Rnv. 800. As to what constitutes notice, see (1921) 5 DInqx:. L.
REv. 470. Thus, the Massey case has been criticized on the ground that the
usual understanding of all parties concerned is that a deposit of money
creates a fiduciary instead of a debtor-creditor relationship. See Comment
(1916) 10 ILL. L. REv. 602.
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of the petition in bankruptcy provided that the bank did not
acquire the claim for this specific purpose.' Where there has
been collusion betwreen the bank and the customer, so that the
deposit has in fact been built up to enable the bank to exercise
its set-off, it will not be permitted.8
The holding of the instant case, that "the deposit itself was
affected with the statutory invalidity" differs from the result
generally reached in construing the similar wording of § 60 (b),
namely, that a mere deposit of funds is not such a "transfer"
as to affect a preference,9 the essential element of a diminution
of the estate being absent.10 But in construing this same word-
ing, the problem as to the effect of payment by check to a drawee
bank during the four months' period has presented issues' of
greater difficulty. A check drawn in favor of a bank having no
reasonable cause to believe a preference will be effected by its
receipt, will not be declared a voidable preference within the
terms of the Act,11 even though the payment be in settlement
of unmatured obligations.12 When a bank accepts the customer's
check drawn upon it, and it has reasonable cause to believe that
a preference will be affected, courts differ as to the effect of the
transaction. Some courts hold that it constitutes a preference,
and not only is the payment by check voidable, but the bank's
set-off is thereafter automatically precluded, notwithstanding
the fact that if the bank had merely set off the funds on deposit
7 Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U. S. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 806 (1912);
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Coppard, 227 Fed. 597 (C. C. A. 5th, 1915);
Booth v. Prete, 81 Conn. 636, 71 Atl. 938, 20 L. R. A. (N. s.) 863 (1909);
see Eager, Set-Off of Bank Deposit against Indebtedness under the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1924) 10 VA. L. REV. 575.
8 First Nat. Bank of El Centro v. Harper, 254 Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 9th,
1918).
9 N. Y. Co. Nat. Bank v. Massey, supra note 6; In re Radley Steel Con-
struction Co., 212 Fed. 462 (E. D. N. Y. 1914).
10 "A deposit of money to one's credit inf a bank does not operate to
diminish the estate of the depositor, for when he parts with the money
he creates, at the same time, on the part of the bank, an obligation to
pay the amount of the deposit as soon as the depositor may see fit to
draw a check against it." New York Co. Nat. Bank v. Massey, supra
note 6, at 147, 24 Sup. Ct. at 201.
11 Wrenn v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 96 Conn. 374, 114 Atl. 120 (1921) ; Ameri-
can Bank & Trust Co. v. Coppard, supra note 7; of. Studley v. Boylston
Nat. Bank, supra note 7.
It has sometimes been felt that the courts have been too ready to be
convinced of the innocence of the bank in such situations, it being considered
that banks are not only in an adv.antageous position to follow the financial
fortunes of their customers, but that it is also distinctly to their welfare
to do so. See Chumbley, Bank's Right of Set-Off in Bank-upteJ (1927)
13 VA. L. REG. (N. S.) 137.
12 Cf. Putnam v. United States Trust Co., 223 Mass. 199, 111 N. E. 969
(1916).
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against their claim, the set-off would have been allowed.'3
Others, relying upon a famous dictum that "there is nothing in
68 (a) which prevents the parties from voluntarily doing before
the petition is filed, what the law itself requires to be done after
proceedings in bankruptcy are instituted" '4 uphold such a pay-
ment by check, , as merely another method of accomplishing the
set-off.1  But as maturity of the items is ordinarily considered
a prerequisite to a bank's privilege of set-off before bank-
ruptcy, '7 a check to a bank in payment of an unmatured
obligation under such circumstances would surely be invalid.'5
After bankruptcy, of course, an unmatured item may be set off
under 68 (a) as a "provable claim." 10
Although the decision under the state statute is probably con-
trary to that which would have obtained under the federal Act,
there would seem to be no constitutional question involved for
the instant provision is merely a fraudulent transfer enactment.
Section 67 (e) of the federal Act providing that the trustee in
bankruptcy may "avoid any transfer which any creditor of such
bankrupt might have avoided" is construed to mean any transfer
'3 In re Starkweather & Albert, 206 Fed. 797 (W. D. Mo. 1913); Knoll
v. Commercial Trust Co., 249 Pa. 197, 94 Atl. 750 (1915); In re National
Lumber Co., 212 Fed. 92S (C. C. A. 3d, 1914).
'4 Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, supra note 7, at 528, 33 Sup. Ct. at 808.
15 Toof v. City Nat. Bank, 206 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Jandrew
v. Guaranty State Bank, 294 Fed. 530 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Drugan v.
Crabtree, 299 Fed. 115 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Comment (1917) 15 Micii. L.
REV. 249; (1913) 12 MICH. L. REV. 50; (1925) 22 Mxci. L. REV. 836; See
COLLImR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1615.
10 Wilson v. Citizens' Trust Co., 233 Fed. 697 (S. D. Ga. 1916) ; R ,I.;G-
TON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) § 1463.
27 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1613.
In some jurisdictions, equity may under special circumstances allow a
set-off of unmatured items that would not be allowed at law. Where such
a rule prevails, insolvency is generally considered such a circumstance.
Wunderlich v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 109 Blinn. 468, 124 N. W. 223, 27
L. R. A. (N. s.) 811 (1910); Kentucky Flour Co.'s Assignee v. Merchants'
Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 225, 13 S. W. 910 (1890). See Note (1910) 25 L. Rl.
A. (N. s.) 393, where it is suggested that dealings between banks and
depositors are such as especially to lend themselves to this special equity rule.
But see Homer v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 140 Mlo. 225, 41 S. W. 790
(1897).
Where a set-off is permitted in such a jurisdiction, the insolvent depositor
cannot sue for damages upon dishonor of his checks. Parker v. First Nat.
Bank, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac. 39 (1923); (1924) 10 VA. L. REV. 396.
As to the general problem, see Clark, Set-Off of Immature Claiias I,
Insolvency (1920) 34 HLAv. L. REV. 178; (1913) 77 CENT. L. J. 271; (1915)
81 CENT. L. J. 318; (1916) 2 IowA L. BLTL. 36.
Is Ridge Ave. Bank v. Studheim, 145 Fed. 798 (C. C. A. 3d, 1906).
19 In re Philip Semmer Glass Co., 135 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905);
Germania Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Loeb, 188 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 6th,
1911).
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that might have been avoided under the laws of the state where
the transaction occurred. 20  Fraudulent transfers as defined by
local law are thus given effect, though the transfer may involve
different elements than those involved in preferential transfers
under the federal Act.21
The result of the instant case has been achieved in the absence
of such a state statute by means of the "trust fund" theory of
corporate assets, where the bank actually "did not change its
position" because of the particular deposit. - If such "change"
had been made, the bank would have been protected as a bona
fide transferee for value, which class also received protection
under the New York Stock Corporation Law.23
The phase of the case of perhaps the most difficulty relates
to the allocation of the untainted deposit to the check given to
the bank. The check was for $5,000. At the time it was drawn
it appears there were about $3,500 of deposits made with no
intent to prefer and $6,000 in deposits added with the inten-
tion of preferring the bank and other creditors. At the time
of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, approximately $200
remained. By an application of the rule in Clayton's Case,"'
that the money first deposited is deemed to be the first drawn
out, the result obtained by the court would follow, since the check
to the bank was the first paid after the preferential deposit. Thus
a set-off was allowed to the extent of the original deposits.21
If the checks of the bankrupt presented to the bank for pay-
ment after the deposit of the $6,000 were all drawn with the
20 Baldwin v. Kingston, 247 Fed. 163 (D. N. J. 1918); Manders v. Wilson,
230 Fed. 536 (N. D. Cal. 1915).
21 In re Zabawski, 283 Fed. 552 (E. D. Mich. 1922) ; Anderson v. Gray,
284 Fed. 770 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922). This is true not only in that the state
statute disregards the intent of the creditor, but also in thab the state
statute makes no provision for a time limitation, which would seem to lend
itself to much business instability.
22 Woods v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 126 Wash. 346, 218 Pac. 266 (1923).
23 "No such conveyance, assignment or transfer shall be void in the hands
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice." N. Y. STOI¢
CORPORATION LAW § 15. In the instant case it was contended that the bank
was a purchaser for value of the check, in that it had lost the indorsers on
the corporation's note for failure to make presentment and give notice of
dishonor. But the court held that the indorsers by participating in the
preferential transfer had waived the requirements of notice, and were still
responsible. For a discussion of this point see (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 817.
241 Mer. 572 (1816); (1923) 23 COL. L. REV. 488; Note (1914) 28 HAnv.
L. REv. 194.
25 Had there been additional deposits and drawings, a situation might
easily have been presented where, by an application of this presumption,
the entire payment to the bank would have been protected. Or in a differ-
ent situation, the entire payment could have been invalid, that is, if other
creditors had presented their checks first so as to deplete the original
deposit, there being only tainted funds left.
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intent of effecting preferences, the application of the rule in
Clayton's Case might be justified on grounds of expedience since
the payments would all be on the same footing. But if, as may
have been the case, some of the checks paid by the bank after
the $6,000 deposit were previously outstanding or were not in-
tended to effect preferences, the rule in Clayton's Case would
seem not to be applicable. Since the problem is in effect one of
tracing trust funds, it would seem more appropriate to consider
the applicability of the rule in Knatchbzdl's case,2-° namely, that
when a wrongdoing trustee aeposits trust funds in his personal
account, his subsequent drawings are first allocated to non-trust
deposits. But the rule in KwtchbzdVs case would not apply,
since in the instant case the problem is not limited to tracing
trust funds into the trustee's personal account. Rather it is a
matter of tracing the trust money through the account into the
hands of the one receiving payment. Independently of the pre-
sumption of either Clayton's Case or Kvvtchbull's case this
would ordinarily be possible where the preferred creditor was
aware of the breach of trust,27 or as here, where by virtue of the
statute, the intent of the creditor is immaterial. In order to
trace the trust funds to the payment of the bank's check, how-
ever, it is necessary to establish an intent on the part of the
bankrupt to have the check paid out of the preferential deposit.
The court assumed that there was an intent to pay the check
out of the preferential deposit only to the extent that the deposit
was necessary to make good the check to the bank. While it
may be true that no other intent could have been shown in the
instant case, cases can be imagined where such an intent could
be readily proved, for example where there were outstanding
checks to the amount of the original deposit before the pref-
erential deposit was made.
The court evidently intended to put the parties in sftdu qto.
The check was set aside. But the privilege of set-off had not
existed at the time of the payment by check, since the obligation
of the bankrupt was still unmatured, -" whereas the privilege of
set-off allowed by the court did not exist until the obligation was
2GKnatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1879); see Scott, The Right to
Follow Money W-rongfully Mingled With Othwr Moncy (1913) 27 HARV.
L. REv. 125; Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 265; cf. In re Oatway, [1903]
2 Ch. 356.
27 Ames, Following Misappropriatcd Property Into Its Prodtct (1900)
19 HARv. L. REv. 511.
28 The instant case would thus seem to overrule in part the case of Irish
v. Citizen's Trust Co., 163 Fed. 880 (N. D. N. Y. 1908), where, in a
similar situation, set-off was not permitted on the unmatured indebtedness,
"status quo" being there considered as of the time the payment by cheeck
was made. The Irish case was not mentioned in the instant decision. Cf.
also Ridge Ave. Bank v. Studheim, sitpra note 18 (similar holding involving
§ 60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act).
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matured by bankruptcy. The effect given to the check thus
insured to the bank the possession of the money after bank-
ruptcy, which it might otherwise have been unable to retain.
A ready means is thus provided a bankrupt depositor to prefer
a creditor bank as to unmatured obligations. It would seem
important therefore to ascertain whether there were in fact
subsequent drawings or attachments which, but for the check,
would have deprived the bank of the possession of the money
which it was allowed to set off. The court's seeming unwilling-
ness to penalize a bank by enforcing the statute strictly raises
at least a doubt as to the desirability of the New York statute
as a matter of policy.29
POWERS OF TRUSTEES TO EXECUTE LONG TERM LEASES
If a trustee has a legal estate in fee simple, he has the power
to execute a lease for any term of years, regardless of the length
of such term to a lessee without notice of the trust.1 If the
lessee were a bona fide purchaser for value, he would be pro-
tected as against any claim of the cestui que trust. As a prac-
tical matter, however, the lessee generally has notice of the trust,
and the question usually arising is as to the length of term for
which the trustee may lease the trust property so as to bind the
trust estate without being guilty of a breach of trust.
Aside from the power of a trustee who has a legal estate in fee
simple to convey for any term of years to a bona fide purchaser
for value, and thus to bind the estate, there is no substantial dis-
tinction between the powers of such trustee and those of one who
has the legal title only for the lives of the cestuis que trust. In
29 Cf. Irish v. Citizen's Trust Co., supra note 28, where set-off was allowed
the innocent bank on matured indebtedness although the Stock Corporation
Law had been violated. It was stated at 890: "Can we impose a penalty
on the trust company for the reason the furniture company (insolvent
corporation depositor) had an intent to prefer not known to or shared or
participated in by the trust company?"
"We would thus have the spectacle of a court penalizing a bank innocent
of guilty knowledge or wrongdoing for a transaction consonant with the
usual and orderly course of a banking business. I am of the opinion that
the legislature of New York never intended that section 66 (now section 15)
should be tortured to accomplish such a result." Howland v. Metropolitan
Bank, 228 Fed. 542, 546 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
11 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) § 629; Greason v. Keteltas,
17 N. Y. 491 (1858). A lease for any number of years is not in violation
of the rule against perpetuities, since the lessor is not thereby precluded
from disposing of the property at will, nor is the lessee hindered In
assigning the lease; and by uniting in a conveyance, the lessor and the
lessee may freely and without restraint convey both the fee and the lease-
hold interest. Todhunter v. Des Moines R. R., 58 Iowa 205, 12 N. W.
267 (1882); Sioux City Terminal R. R. v. Trust Co., 82 Fed. 124 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1897).
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either case the trustee's control of the property is limited, and
the trustee who holds the fee is no more privileged in equity to
wrest the right to manage the property from those entitled
thereto at the termination of the trust than is the trustee whose
legal title is limited to the lives of the cestuis or of any other
persons. Therefore, as should be expected, the courts make no
distinction between the trustee who has a legal title in fee simple
and one who has the legal estate only for the life of a third per-
son, with respect to their powers of executing leases which will
not constitute breaches of trust.2  The generally accepted theory
seems to be that the estate of a trustee who is to receive rents
and profits, and to pay or apply them to the use of another for
life, is in the nature of an estate pu" cwtre 'ic. The validity of
the lease depends not on the extent of the trustee's legal estate,
but on the extent of his power.
POWER TO EXECUTE LONG TERM LEASES WITHOUT APPLICATION TO A
COURT OF EQUITY
The question of the power of a trustee to make any lease at all,
as well as of his power to make long term leases, is primarily a
question of the intention of the settlor of the trust. This inten-
tion is to be ascertained by a construction of the whole instru-
ment creating the trust, with reference to the surrounding cir-
cumstances, such as the character of the property and of the
neighboring property; the desirability of securing a fair income,
the customary length of leases in the particular locality, and like
propositions. Where the trust is passive, there can be no implied
power to lease,4 and there is no such power where the instrument
2 In re Hubbell Trust, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N. W. 512 (1907) (trustee with
fee held to have no power to bind remaindermen); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Daughetee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N. E. 818 (1909) (trustee with fee held not
to have power to make oil leases for five years "and as much longer as
gas and oil should be found in paying quantities"). But see Kales, Pawcr
in Trustees to Malke Lcases (1913) 7 ILL. L. REv. 427, 428. Only one
case has been found supporting the proposition that the trustee who has a
fee may, without breach of trust, execute a lease which extends not unrea-
sonably beyond the term of trust. Hines v. McCombs, 2 Ga. App.
675, 58 S. E. 1124 (1907) (two-year lease executed by a trustee with the
fee permitted to continue after termination of the trust).
3 Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 42 N. E. 8 (1395); In re Armory
Board, 29 Misc. 174, 60 N. Y. Supp. 882 (Sup. Ct. 1899); In re Hubbell
Trust, sapra note 2.
A statute in New York vests the legal estate in the remainderman upon
the death of the person whose life determines the trust. N. Y. REAL
PRoPERTY LAw (1909) § 109.
4 Hefferman v. Taylor, 15 Ont. 670 (1888).
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creating the trust indicates a contrary intentionA If the trust
instrument expressly grants power to lease for a certain term,
there can be no implied authority to grant a lease for a longer
term, for this would be to deviate from the limitations
of the grant.0 But although a lease for a longer term than is
permitted by an express provision in the trust instrument is void
at law, it is valid in equity for the term of years corresponding
with the power, and is void only as to the excess.7
Where the words of the trust instrument show an intention
of the trustor that the trustee should have extensive powers of
leasing the trust property, the trustee may execute long term
leases. Thus when the trustee is given power "to dispose of any
of my real estate in fee simple, or for a term of years, or other-
vise, in as full and large a manner in every respect as I could
myself, if living," 8 or "to lease any portion of said real estate for
such period, and upon such terms and conditions, as they shall
think best," 9 such trustee has almost unlimited power in the mat-
ter of executing leases, subject to the condition, of course, that
he must act in good faith for the best interests of the estate.
A trustee who is charged with the receipt and disposal of the
income from trust property must necessarily be impliedly author-
ized to make leases for reasonable periods and at reasonable
rents, in the absence of any express provision to that effect in the
declaration of trust.0 Such authority is necessary in order that
an income may be obtained from the property. The question as
to whether the lease is a reasonable one, if not to be ascertained
6 Evans v. Jackson, 6 L. J. Ch. 8 (1837) (testator bequeathed leaseholds
to trustees to sell; being unable to find a purchaser, the trustees agreed
to grant an underlease to A, but A upon discovering the trust for sale,
refused to accept; bill by trustees against A for specific performance was
dismissed).
a Bowes v. East London Co., Jac. 324 (1821). A power to make leases
"for twenty-one years from the making thereof" does not permit execution
of a lease for 21 years td begin in future. Griffen v. Ford, 14 N. Y.
Super. Ct. 123 (1851).
7 In re Hubbell Trust, supra note 2; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 172 Iowa 538,
154 N. W. 867 (1915); Griffen v. Ford, supra note 6.
8 Prather v. Foote, 1 Disn. 434 (Ohio 1837) (99-year lease).
9 Goddard v. Brown, 12 R. I. 31 (1878).
10 Hedges v. Riker, 5 Johns Ch. 163 (N. Y. 1821); Black v. Higon, Harp.
Eq. 205 (S. C. 1824) ; Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N. Y. 296 (1849) ; Newcomb v.
Keteltas, 19 Barb. 608 (N. Y. 1855); Greason v. Keteltas, supra note 1;
City of Richmond v. Davis, 103 Ind. 449, 3 N. E. 130 (1885); Matter of
Odell's Estate, 4 N. Y. Supp. 463 (Surr. Ct. 1888); Miller v. Smythe, 92
Ga. 154, 18 S. E. 46 (1893); Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 22 T, 33 N. E. 858
(1893); Corse v. Corse, 144 N. Y. 569, 39 N. E. 630 (1895); Hutcheson
v. Bennefield, 115 Ga. 990, 42 S. E. 422 (1902) ; In re Hubbell Trust, supra
note 2; Naylor v. Arnitt, 1 Russ. & M. 501 (1830); Fitzpatrick v. Waring,
11 L. R. Ir. 35 (1882); Brooke v. Brown, 19 Ont. 124 (1890); 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1060.
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from the trust instrument itself, must of necessity depend upon
the nature of the property, the use to be made of it, the income to
be derived therefrom, the local customs in renting, and the im-
provements which may be contracted to be made by the les!see."
The period, then, is reasonable if the lease for such period ap-
pears to be essential or desirable in order that the purpose of
the settlor in creating the trust may be effected. It seems that
a provision in the trust instrument for a general power to lease,
without stating the term which may be granted, adds nothing to
the implied power of the trustee to execute a reasonable lease,
and that the same limitations upon his power exist in either case.
If a lease granted by a trustee accords with the custom of
the place, is reasonable and usual as to its duration, and the
amount of rental stipulated to be paid is, under all the circum-
stances at the time of the execution of the lease, fair and
adequate compensation, such lease will be upheld as within the
power of the trustee.12  But, on the other hand, if, under all
the circumstances, the duration of the lease is for an unreason-
able length of time, although it may be within the period for
which the trust is to continue, or for a stipulated rent which
is inadequate, or for any other sufficient reason it was not for
the best interest of the trust estate that the lease should have
been granted, a court of equity might set aside the lease as an
abuse of power on the part of the trustee. 13 The trustee must
act with as great fidelity toward the remainderman who will
receive the title upon the termination of the trust as toward
the beneficiaries who may be entitled to the rents and profits
during the existence of the trust.14
The extent of the power, apart from any express provision
in the trust instrument, to make a lease which will be valid
and binding even after the termination of the trust, is a question
upon which the decisions are not entirely in accord. The law
of England is regarded as settled that trustees without express
authority may not execute leases for terms which are likely to
extend beyond the trust period; and there is considered to be
a further limitation on their power when there is a possibility,
albeit remote, that the lease may so extend.'5
" In re Hubbell Trust, supra note 2.
12Hutcheson v. Bennefield, svpra note 10.
.3 Cf. ibid.
14 In re Hubbell Trust, supra note 2.
35In re Shaw's Trust, L. R. 12 Eq. 124 (1871) (application for approval
of a ten-year lease denied; term reasonable under circumstances; possibility
of extension beyond trust period remote); Wood v. Pattezon, 10 Beav.
541 (1847). But cf. Naylor v. Arnitt, supra note 10 (lease for ten-year
term held valid); and see Attorney General v. Owen, 10 Ves. 555, 5G6
(1805) (test of reasonableness of duration of the lease applied).
An Irish case, Fitzpatrick v. Waring, supra note 10, held that the lease
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There are some American decisions which recognize the power
of a trustee to execute a lease extending beyond the term of
the trust, although the terms of the trust instrument did not
expressly authorize him to make such a lease.10 But with the
exception of an early case,17 all the New York decisions are to
the effect that the trustee without express authority, or
authority of an equitable decree, has no power to lease real
property for a period reasonably certain to extend beyond the
term of the trust, 8 and even if the period of the lease at the
time of its execution was not likely to extend beyond the trust
term, when the trust does terminate before the lease, the balance
was binding on the persons entitled to the trust property upon the ter-
mination of the trust.
A Canadian case, Brooke v. Brown, supra note 10, upheld the power
of trustees, where there was express power absolutely to convey the prop-
erty, to execute a building lease for 21 years, with provision for
compensation to lessee at end of term for improvements made, or renewal
for a like term.
18Collins v. McTavish, 63 Md. 166 (1885); Collins v. Foley, 63 Md.
158 (1885); Sweeney v. Hagerstown Trust Co., 144 Md. 612, 125 Atl. 522
(1924). In the first two cases the trustee was empowered to make such
change of investment of the estate as seemed advantagous, and, it was
held that an agreement to lease, renewable forever, was within the trustee's
power. The third case cannot be put upon such express power, but it
was held that a five-year lease was valid even beyond the termination
of the trust period because the term was customary and necessary to
secure a fair income from the property and did not extend beyond the
period during which the trust was likely to continue, since the beneficiary
had, an expectancy of eight years at the time the lease was executed.
Accord: Hines v. McCombs, supra note 2 (two-year farming lease executed
by trustee held not terminated upon expiration of the trust).
Bergengren v. Aldrich, 139 Mass. 259, 29 N. E. 667 (1885) determined
that a renewal agreement cannot bind remainderman. Accord: Gomez v.
Gomez, 147 N. Y. 195, 41 N. E. 420 (1895). But see Sweeney v. Hagers-
town Trust Co., supra at 622, 125 Atl. at 526.
Where valuable improvements have been made by a lessee, under a
long term lease by a trustee whose trust estate was likely to continue beyond
the period of the lease, it has been held that the lessee was entitled to
possession for the balance of the term. Butler v. Topkis, 63 Atl. 646 (Dol.
Ch. 1906).
17 Greasoi v. Keteltas, supra note 1. In In re Hubbell, s'pra note 2, at
655, 113 N. W. at 519, it was said concerning the Greason case: "Though
the trust period had not expired and the decision might have been planted
on some other ground, this case seems to fairly determine that trustees
for a long time can execute leases which may extend beyond the trust
period, though later opinions of the courts of that state cast some doubt
on what was really decided."
18 Matter of Opening of One Hundred and Tenth Street, 81 App. Div.
27, 81 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dep't 1903), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 572, 73 N. E. 1127
(1904) (trustee executed lease for 20 years at a time when the beneficiary,
whose life determined the trust, was 66 years of age) ; Matter of Armory
Board, supra note 3; Tredwell v. Tredwell, 86 Misc. 104, 148 N. Y. Supp.
391 (Sup. Ct. 1914) ; Corse v. C6rse, supra note 10.
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of the lease is defeated. 2 The lease is valid, however, so long
as the trust continues, the lease terminating upon the expiration
of the trust.20
Aside from the few cases in Maryland 21 and Delaware,22 the
weight of authority supports the rule that, in the absence of
express authority therefor, conferred upon the trustee by the
trust instrument, the trustee is without power to lease the trust
property for a term extending beyond the life of the trust, and
that where, nevertheless, the trustee makes a lease which con-
tinues beyond the trust term, the excessive period-Le., the
period which extends beyond the termination of the trust-will
be void.23 The reason for the rule is said to be that the trustee
has no power to prevent the beneficiaries of the trust from enjoy-
ing the estate as contemplated in the trust instrument, when
the trust is terminated.4
19 Matter of McCaffrey's Estate, 50 Hun 371, 3 N. Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct.
1888); Weir v. Barker, 104 App. Div. 112, 93 N. Y. Supp. 7132 (2d Dep't
1905); Aimone Mfg. Co. v. Schultz, 210 App. Div. 41, 205 N. Y. Supp.
170 (1st Dep't 1924).
2 See N. Y. REAL PROPTY LAW (1909) §§ 106, 107. In construing
these sections, it was said in Weir v. Barker, :mpra note 19, that the
legislative intent was to extend, rather than to restrict, the powers of a
trustee. It was there held that a five-year lease with option in lessee to
renew was not void as between lessee and trustee, with respect to the
renewal period, although there had been no application to the court for
authority to execute the lease.
21 Supra note 16.
2 Svpra-note 16. In Crown Co. v. Cohn, 88 Ore. 642, 172 Pac. 804
(1918), the trustees leased the trust property for thirty years at a time
when the youngest trustee had an expectancy of 2S.18 years. The trust
was to continue until the death of the last of five trustees. It was held
that there was an implied power to lease upon such terms and conditions
as usually prevail in the city in which the land is situated and that the
lease would not be rescinded at the instance of the lessees merely because
the period of the lease was slightly in excess of the anticipation of life
of the youngest trustee. The court, however, did not say that the lease
would not expire upon the termination of the trust period.
2- South End Warehouse Co. v. Lavery, 12 Cal. App. 449, 10T Pac. 1008
(1910); Hunt v. Lawton, 245 Pac. 803 (Cal. 1926); Standard Metallic
Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Pa. 474, 19 AtI. 411 (1890) (30-year
lease); St. Louis Trust Co. v. Van Raalte, 214 Mo. App. 172, 259 S. W.
1067 (1923) (99-year lease and the ex\ pectancy of the person whose life
determined the trust was 40 years); Cox v. Kinston Co., 175 N. C. 299,
95 S. E. 623 (1918); Pa. Horticultural Soc. v. Craig, 240 Pa. 137, 87 Ati.
678 (1913) (30-year lease).
24 Cox v. Kinston Co., supra note 23.
No application to the court is necessary under the statute if there is an
express power given to the trustee by the terms of the trust instrument
to lease for a term extending beyond the termination of the trust. Raynolds
v. Browning, King & Co., 123 Misc. 367, 205 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct.
1924), aff'd, 217 App. Div. 443, 217 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1st Dep't 1926).
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II
POWER TO EXECUTE LONG TERM LEASES UPON APPLICATION TO A
COURT OF EQUITY
It frequently happens that the character of the trust property
and of the particular locality has changed, since the creation
of the trust, to such an extent that leases of moderate duration
which formerly would yield a profitable income for the bene-
ficiaries, will no longer bring such income to the estate, and
that only leases for long terms can be profitably negotiated. The
buildings may have become delapidated and the estate may not
have sufficient funds to replace the structures. 'A lessee must
be granted a long term lease if he contemplates construction
of a building of any consequence upon the premises, and such
long term must be free from the contingency of premature ter-
mination. Thus there must be some means by which the trust
property may be made productive of income to the estate in
such instances, and this can be done only by removing the legal
disability of the trustee to execute leases which will be valid
after the termination of the trust.
The New York statute was enacted for the purpose of pro-
viding a means by which the lessee may have the power to make
a valid lease the duration of which will not be determined by
the termination of the trust. 5 The statute provides that, upon
application to the supreme court therefor, that court may by
order authorize a trustee who holds real property during the
life of a beneficiary for the purpose of applying the rents and
profits for the use of such beneficiary, to lease such property
for a term exceeding five years, "if it appears to the satisfaction
of the court that it is for the best interest of the trust estate." -0
25 N. Y. REAL PROPRTY LAW (1909) §§ 106, 107. "It was undoubtedly
the settled law of this state at the time of the original passage of the act
in question in 1895 that such lease was not binding on remaindermon,
but was valid only for a period ending with the trust term." Weir v.
Barker, supra note 19, at 115, 93 N. Y. Supp. at 734. "The statute as thus
amended was clearly an enabling statute . . . the Legislature having
attempted to make leases executed in the manner provided valid and binding
upon remaindermen after the expiration of the trust term so far as it
had the power to do so.- It is unnecessary to determine now to what
extent the Legislature has succeeded in that purpose . . ." Ibid.
119, 93 N. Y. Supp. at 737. See Aimone Mfg. Co. v. Schultz, supra note
19, at 46, 205 N. Y. Supp. at 173.2GIn Weir v. Barker, supra note 19, it was held that application to the
court was unnecessary to the validity of a lease for a term of five years,
with the option to the lessee to renew for another period of five years, and
that such application is necessary under the statute only in order to
validate that portion of the term which may extend beyond the termination
of the trust. But in Thirty-nine Cortlandt St. Corp. v. Lambert, 209 App.
Div. 575, 580, 205 N. Y. Supp. 161, 164 (1st Dep't 1924), it was said
that the statute". . . must be construed to mean that a trustee who
800
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In other jurisdictions where the question has arisen, the same
result as has been provided for in New York has been reached
without such a statutory provision. The courts are not all in
accord as to what are the prerequisites in order that a decree
by a court of equity may be obtained authorizing a long term
lease. All that is necessary in some jurisdictions is that the
proposed lease must be manifestly for the benefit of all parties
concerned, and that those of such parties who were capable of
consenting gave their consent..2 7  And in such cases a decree
authorizing such lease is binding upon beneficiaries not in being,
if their interests are identical with those of persons in being who
are before the court.28
The Wisconsin 2 9 and Illinois 23 courts have gone far in exer-
would make a lease must limit the term to five years or obtain the court's
order for the execution of a lease of longer term."
Since the statute refers only to trusts in which the trustee holds the
property during the life of a beneficiary, query as to whether the court
would authorize a lease e.\tending beyond the trust term, in a case where
the trustee holds during the life of a person other than the beneficiary.
27 Waddell v. United Cigar Stores, 195 N. C. 434, 142 S. E. 5S5 (1923).
But here although the lease was for a term of thirty years, the expectancies
of the beneficiaries, whose lives determined the existence of the trust, were
greater than the term of the lease.
A court of chancery has general supervision over trust estates, and may
direct such a disposition as, in its discretion, seems beneficial to all parties
interested. Hale v. Hale, sv'pra note 10 (a sale); Gavin v. Curtin, 171
Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1893) se-,nblc.2 8 Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113, 73 N. E. 409 (1903).29 Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N. W. 5 (1913). A 99-yea?
lease was authorized by the court. The considerations which influenced
the court were: that the particular realty was of a kind which could most
profitably be handled by long term leases; that a 99-year lease, so common
in large cities, was within all reasonable limitations under the circum-
stances; and that such broad powers of "entire control, managemcnt, and
charge of the estate" had been committed to the trustees. It was said for
the majority, Tzipra at 293, 140 N. W. at 12: "So in matter of administra-
tion, out of the ordinary, as in this case, the court must tand in place
of the creator of the trust, as near as may be, and speak by his implied
directions under the new conditions." Two of the justices dissented on
the ground that when power to lease is either e.pressly or implicdly
conferred, the duration of such lease is measured by the length of the
trust period, and here the trust period ended with the death of a bene-
ficiary whose expectancy at the time of execution of the lease was 16 years,
and thus the decision of the majority deprived the remaindermen of
possession.
30 Denegre v. Walker, su~pra note 28 (99-year lease authorized when trust
was to terminate within eight months, although possibility that the time
of distribution might be delayed because of suits pending against the
settlor's estate); Marsh v. Reed, 1S4 Ill. 263, 56 N. E. "06 (1900) (,ettlor
had expressly provided that no lease should be for a longer term than ten
years; decree granted for the execution of a 99-year lease; all adult
beneficiaries consenting and it being shown that such lease was necessary
to effectuate the design of the donor); cf. Packard v. Illinois Trust & Say.
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cising equitable jurisdiction to authorize long term leases, for
the reason merely that the lease is beneficial to the trust estate,
or a good business venture, though not of underlying necessity
for the preservation of the estate. On the other hand, the
majority of the cases in which application to courts of equity
has been made for authority to execute long term leases have
held that the duration of the trust ordinarily limits the term
for which such property may be leased by the trustees, and to
take the particular case out of that rule, there must be shown
to exist an exigency rendering an execution of a long term lease
reasonably necessary for the preservation of the property, or
for effectuating the intention of the trustor with regard to the
purposes of the trust.31 There seems to be a trend to determine
that the lease is "reasonably necessary" within the rule, when
it is highly beneficial to all the parties and advantageous to
the income of the estate.32
III
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Since a charitable trust is frequently a perpetuity, and the
trustee does not have to be guided at once by the interests of
the beneficiaries and by the interests of the remaindermen, it is
to be expected that greater discretionary power as to the execu-
tion of leases is held by the trustee of a charitable trust than by
the trustee of a private trust. Still there should not be, upon
principle, any difference except that based upon the precarious-
ness of the term, in the case of private trusts. Thus, if the
settlor of a charitable trust should provide that the trust should
terminate upon the death of some third person, it would seem
that there would be no greater power in the matter of execution
of leases in such trustee than if the trust were private and
not charitable.
Bank, 261 I1. 450, 104 N. E. 275 (1914) (99-year lease authorized upon
the ground of necessity by reason of changed character of neighborhood; in
furtherance of presumed general plan of the testator).31 In re Hubbell Trust, supra note 2; Watland v. Good, 189 Iowa 1174,
179 N, W. 613 (1920); Marshall's Trustee v. Marshall, 225 Iy. 168, 7
S. W. (2d) 1062 (1928); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Van Raulte, sulpra
note 23.
32 In Marshall's Trustee v. Marshall, supra note 31, the testator devised
the remainder of his estate to a trustee to hold in trust for the widow and
son and the son's unborn children. The property included a storehouse
and lot which rented for $14,000 per year under a lease to expire in 1932,
The trustee filed a bill under the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging
that he had an offer to take a lease upon the premises for a term of 99
years, which would yield a net rent of over $20,000 per year, and that the
lessee was to erect an eight story department store building on the property.
Both the widow and son assented, the son having no children. It was
held that the surrounding circumstances showed that it was necessary to
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In England, although we have seen that as to private trusts
the trustee's power is greatly limited,33 the power of the trustee
of a charitable trust to execute long term leases is very exten-
sive31 In an Indiana case, 5 upholding perpetual leases by the
trustee of a charitable trust, it is said that, as a general proposi-
tion, lands devised in trust for charitable uses should not be
leased for long terms, without the order of a court of equity,
but such leases, although perpetual, and executed without the
order of the court, are not necessarily void, and will not be set
aside unless it is made to appear that they are detrimental to
the interests of the trust.0 There seem to, be no cases which
pronounce a rule at variance with that expressed in the English
and Indiana cases.
37
execute the 99-year lease properly to protect the interests of all the parties,
since the old building could not be advantageously rented, and the new
building would bring in more revenue and also make the property more
valuable.
This is a much more liberal interpretation of the requirement of necessity
for such a long term lease than the rule stated in In re Hubbell Trust,
supra note 2.
33 Wood v. Patteson; In re Shaw's Trust, both supra note 15.34
"That which the Court might have done, upon its own consideration
of what would have been beneficial to the charity, might have been done
by trustees, upon their own authority, in the exercise of their legal powers;
and however imprudent it may have been in trustees to take so great a
risk upon themselves, and in other parties to contract with them and take
conveyances from them under such circumstances; yet, if upon consideration
it should appear upon subsequent investigation, that the transaction was
fair and beneficial to the charity at the time, it does not appear to be the
duty of the court to set it aside, merely because' circumstances have
occurred, in which, at the time of inquiry and after the lapse of many
years, it may be supposed that a greater revenue might have been derived
from the specific property, than from the property substituted on the
alienation complained of.
"The trustee is not permitted to act as he pleases, or upon his own
view of what is best; he is so to act as to be always prepared to show to
the satisfaction of a Court of Equity, that he has acted fairly and prudently
in the administration of the trust, and for the benefit of the cestui que
trust." Attorney General v. The South Sea Co., 4 Beav. 453, 458 (1841)
(999-year lease of charitable property upheld).
In an earlier ease, Attorney-General v. Owen, supra note 15, the trustees
of a charitable trust executed a 99-year lease of a farm, and it was held
that the lease could not stand without proof of a consideration, showing
that it was fair and reasonable and for the benefit of the charity, the
ordinary husbandry lease being for 21 years.
35 City of Richmond v. Davis, stpra note 10.
36 See HILL, TRusTEEs (4th ed. 1867) 720-721.
37 In Black v. Ligon, supra note 10, the testator devised lands to three
trustees for the support of a charity school, the land never to be sold or
alienated. The school was to be under the direction of five trustees to be
elected every two years. It was held that the five trustees had the power
to lease the trust property for a gross sum, without the reservation of
an annual rent.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE CLAYTON ACT
The United States Supreme Court recently held by unanimous
decision, in George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. America/. Can Co.,
that discrimination in the sale price of an article, by which com-
petition among the purchasers thereof is lessened, is illegal under
section 2 of the Clayton Act., The American Can Company, sub-
stantially without competitors, had sold cans to one packing com-
pany at lower prices than those allowed to a competing packing
company. The case adds a new chapter to the law of trade regu-
lation.
Since Adam Smith, freedom of competition has been not only
an economic, but also a legal principle. Freedom of compe-
tition means freedom to sell to whom and at what price one
pleases, so long as one does not interfere with another's freedom.
So at -ommon law one may refuse to sell to a buyer absolutely,2
or on condition that he handle no goods of a competitor of the
seller,3 or on condition that he maintain a fixed resale price.4 So
one may discriminate in price as to place or person.5 Neither of
these practices appears to have been considered unfair competi-
tion, that is, an interference with another's freedom.
The state has found, however, that modern industry endangers
the public's interest in a fair price to an extent not remediable
by a laissez faire policy, and two methods have been tried to
protect the consumer. One is direct, by fixing the price itself,
the other indirect, by forbidding monopolies and restraints of
competition.
Direct regulation of prices is an ancient device, known to Rome
' George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 49 Sup. Ct. 112
(U. S. 1929). Section 2 of the Clayton Act [38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S.
C. § 13 (1926)] forbids discrimination in price where it substantially les-
sens competition "in any line of commerce," provided that it is not made
because of differences in grade, quality, quantity, or selling or transporta-
tion costs, or that it is not made "in good faith to meet competition."
2 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307, 39 Sup. Ct. 465,
468 (1919); Brown, The Right to Refie to Sell (1916) 25 YAtL L. J. 194.
3 Journal of Commerce Pub. Co. v. Tribune Co., 286 Fed. 111 (C. C. A.
7th, 1922).,
4 See State v. Scollard, 126 Wash. 335, 339, 218 Pac. 224, 225 (1923).
5 Cf. Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A. C. 25 (discrimination law-
ful even when engaged in by combination). Common carriers, howover,
could not discriminate even at common law. 1 WATKINS, SHIPPERiS & CAR-
RniRs (3d ed. 1920) 411.
a See WILKINSON, STATE REGULATION OF PRICES IN AuSTrALIA (1917) 144:
"Reasonable prices are essentially the ultimate aim and object of anti-trust
legislation." Wilkinson points out the limited effectiveness of price fixing
by direct legislation, and mentions two other methods of obtaining the
desiied result, entrance by the state into industry in competition with Its
citizens, and maintenance of state monopolies.
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and the Middle Ages.7 It was common in England and the North
American colonies at the time of the revolution.8 After a century
in which the practice was in bad odor, it has been, especially un-
der the stress of war, increasingly revived.0 In the Unitel
States a limitation has been imposed that the industry, be "af-
fected with a public interest," " but this phrase is still defying
definition."
Indirect control of prices by curbing monopolies began in tlis
country with statutes like the Sherman Act,1- condemning con-
tracts and combinations in restraint of trade. But an individal
manufacturer could still pick his customers; he might refuse to
sell to any but those who maintained his resale price or dealt e.:-
clusively in his own goods; 13 or he might discriminate, raising
prices against buyers who would not agree to his terms,"1 lower-
ing them in localities where he found competition.'5 Such prac-
tices were only unlawful when a contract or combination could
be found by the court.1 , There have been statutes against dis-
crimination in a number of states, some dealing with a particular
7 See Watkins, The Law and the Profits (1922) 32 YLE L. J. 29.
s See Note (1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 838.
9 Cf. W.KInsoN, loe. cit. supra note 6; see MINNEoTA ACADEMY OF So-
CIAL SCIENCES, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (1913) Vol. 6, No. 6, at 41 (Roose-
velt's plan to control all corporations as to price of output by commission).
20 See Mlunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126 (1877).
11 See Note (1920) 19 MICH. L. REV. 74. A state of emergency, and the
demand of public opinion and morality have been held not to create a "pub-
lic interest." A. B1. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont.
1920).
1226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
13 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 431
(1921); United States v. Colgate & Co., su'pra note 2; Dunn, Rcsalc Price
Maintenance (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 676. It would seem to be in the intcret
of the public that resale prices be maintained, and the courts are generally
willing to favor the practice. See Notz, Nov, Phases of Unfair Coinptitioa
(1921) 30 YALE L. J. 384, 387.
-1 Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (C. C. A. 8th,
1903); see Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737, 709 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1909).
15 See STEVENS, UNFAIR CoIErrrioN (1917) c. I. This practice among
the railroads was apparently the chief reason for rate regulation in the In-
terstate Commerce Act. See N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. v. Interstate Com-
merce Comm., 200 U. S. 361, 391, 26 Sup. Ct. 272, 277 (1906). When the
practice was taken up by large manufacturers it was one of the chief ob-
jects at which the Clayton Act was aimed. See infra note 37.
16 Fed. Trade Comm. v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup. Ct.
150 (1922) (contracts and combination implied from general sales system) ;
Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. Nat. Window Glass Jobbers Ass'n, 152 Fed. 364
(C. C. A. 3d, 1907); United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 203 Fed.
733 (N. D. Ohio, 1913). In the Beechnut case it would seem that the com-
bination is prohibited from doing what the defendant in the American Can
Co. case, supra note 1, is being compelled to do, maintain uniform priecs.
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commodity affecting the welfare of the state,17 others more gen-
eral. 8 These statutes have been held constitutional, where the
discrimination condemned is such as results in a restraint of
competition or furthers a monopoly.1" If the statute forbids all
discrimination it is invalid as violating the constitutional right
to liberty of contract,20 the distinction apparently resting on the
same basis as the price regulation statutes, in that some "public
interest," here that of preventing a monopoly, is essential.,
In addition to these statutes against discrimination, the Inter-
state Commerce Act 22 forbids 'unjust discrimination" as to rail-
road rates, and the Federal Trade Commission Act 23 provides for
the regulation of "unfair competition," but neither of these stat-
utes can be discussed in the scope of this comment. 24
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, which was interpreted in the in-
stant case, prohibits discrimination in price, "where the effect of
such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 20 Deci-
sions involving discrimination have not been frequent. There
appears to be only one reported case, decided very recently,
17 Cf. State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co., 117 Minn. 186, 134 N. W. 496
(1912) (milk); State v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527
(1910) (petroleum).
18 Cf. State v. Drayton, 82 Neb. 254, 117 N. W. 768 (1908) (no discrim-
ination in "commodities"). See statutes cited (1926) 26 CoL. L. Rsv. 614.
Under these statutes it does not appear to be unlawful to discriminate in
buying. Indian Refining Co. v. Kellar, 203 Ky. 720, 263 S. W. 9 (1924);
United States v. American Can Co., 230 Fed. 859 (D. Md. 1916). Discrim-
ination between sections of a city does not come within a statute against
local price discrimination. State v. Texas Co., 136 S. C. 200, 134 S. E.
211 (1926). These state statutes are then necessarily limited in effective-
ness, especially as large trusts that are national in scope may discriminato
between states with impunity. See JONES, TRuST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED
STATES (1921) 358.
"D Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66
(1912); State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 133 N. W. 895
(1911); Note (1928) 52 A. L. R. 169. But a statute declaring price dis-
crimination is itself evidence of monopoly is unconstitutional. McFarland
v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 Sup. Ct. 498 (1916).
20 Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minn., 274 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 506 (1927);
(1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 533; cf. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Sup. Ct.
115 (.U. S. 1929).
21 In the Fairmont Creamery Co. case last cited the industry was clearly
"affected with a public interest,", but the court held, three judges dissent-
ing, that there was no immediate relation of the statute to the evil at
which it was aimed, since it forbade discrimination without regard to
monopoly.
2224 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 2 (1926).
2338 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1926).
24 For a treatment of price cutting and preferences as "unfair competi-
tion," see STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 15, cc. I, VII.
25 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1926) ; see supra note 1.
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holding a defendant responsible under the section. -r, The
terms of the section may offer too many loopholes.2 Giving
favored rates to different classes of buyers is permissible if in
good faith.28 So one may discriminate between wholesalers and
retailers; and to class co-operative associations of retailers sepa-
rately from wholesalers is permissible. -0 Similarly where re-
tailers are denied a quantity discount on pooled purchases, they
cannot complain if chain stores receive the discount, the latter
being single corporations and hence entitled to the quantity dis-
count.30
It is obvious that discrimination may aid the discriminator
to break down the competition which he faces, as in the case of
local price cutting. But it may also affect his customers, driving
out of competition those not favored. The Mcnwne case 2 1 stated,
apparently obiter,2 that section 2 of the Clayton Act was aimed
by Congress at the restraint of competition among sellers of
goods only, and that a restraint of competition among the pur-
chasers discriminated against did not make the discrimination
unlawful. The Natonw.1 Biscuit Co. case 33 repeated this, and ap-
parently was helped thereby, in denying protection to single re-
tailers against the chain stores.
Now Justice Sutherland, in the American Can Co. case,
squarely overrules these dicta, and on the certification of two
questions from the court below holds that it is unlawful under
26 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.
(2d) 234 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (manufacturers of "Lucky Strikes" attempt-
Ing to capture Porto Rican market by selling at lower price than in United
States).
27 See supra note 1; see also JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 360. The
statute, for example, does not prohibit a refusal to sell at any price. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 4G (C. C. A.
2d, 1915) (price-cutting retailer has no relief); ef. Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G.
Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E. D. Ark. 1916) (section 3 of Clayton Act
similarly limited).
28 S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A.
6th, 1925); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571 (S. D. N.
Y. 1919).
9 Mennen Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923);
Mechem, Price Discrbmination as Unzfair Compctition (1923) 21 MiCH. L.
REV. 852.
30 Nat. Biscuit Co. v. Fed. Trade, Comm., 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924); Note (1924) 38 HAnv. L. Rv. 103.
3SuVpra note 29.
3 See brief of appellant, American Can Co. case, at 23. The argument
in the Mennen case was based on the assumption that "any line of com-
merce" in the Clayton Act, supra note 1, was ambiguous, and attempted to
show that the framers of the Act intended this to apply to the commerce
of the sellers only. In the appellant's brief at 28 this contention was
disproved by a fuller citation of the congressional records.
33 Supra note 30.
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section 2 of the Clayton Act to discriminate in price where this
tends to lessen competition among the purchasers of the goods.
The discriminator, the defendant in the case, assumedly had no
competitors, so there could be no question of its using unlawful
competitive methods. What its motive was does not appear, the
questions certified merely eliminating the exceptions listed in
the Act.
3 4
The decision is the first handed down in the Supreme Court on
section 2 of the Clayton Act.35 Though it only answers the two
questions certified, and hence does not pass on the constitutional-
ity of the Act, it is believed that cannot now be doubted.30 It
appears to be a perfectly logical interpretation of the Act and
the intentions of its framers.3 7 And within its scope it appears
wise, if it is assumed that the purpose of anti-trust legislation is
the protection of the consuming public, and not of competitors of
the trust.38
But it may be a dangerous precedent unless its scope is limited
to an interpretation of the provisions of the Act involved. Dis-
crimination is condemned by the Act if it is not made because of
differences in grade, quality, or quantity, or selling or transpor-
tation costs, or if it is not "made in good faith to meet competi-
tion." It would seem that the bargaining power of a manufac-
turer may be seriously impaired unless a broad interpretation
34 The questions asked if the Clayton Act prohibited discrimination which
lessened competition in the line of commerce of the vendees of the discrim-
inator, "said discrimination not being made on account of differences in
the grade, quality or quantity of the commodity sold, . . . nor being made
in good faith to meet competition." Compare the terms of section 2, supra
note 1.
3 But in two cases certiorari was denied. Fed. Trade Comm. v. Nat.
Biscuit Co., 266 U. S. 613, 45 Sup. Ct. 95 (1924) ; Fed. Trade Comm. v. Men-
nen Co., 262 U. S. 759, 43 Sup. Ct. 705 (1923).
30 In view of the constitutionality of the similar state statutes, see supra
notes 19 and 20. The interpretation adopted in the instant case should
not affect the constitutionality of section 2 of the Clayton Act if otherwlse
upheld.
37 It was the practice of local price cutting by such large corporations as
the Standard Oil Co. and the American Tobacco Co., engaged in to crush
their small competitors, that was primarily responsible for the statute. See
JONES, op. cit. supra note 19, at 77, 114; Mennen Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm.,
supra note 29, at 778. This was not the only objective of Congress in fram-
ing the Act. See supra note 32. But if the maintenance of competition
among the purchasers of the discriminator had been an important objective
it would seem that the Act would have prohibited also a complete refusal
to sell. See supra note 27. Buyers injured by the methods of a seller are
protected under the Sherman Act. See Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. 3. 503,
511. And under the Trade Commission Act. Fed. Trade Comm. v. Beech-
nut Packing Co., supra note 16. And under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Q. R. S. Music Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 12 F. (2d) 730 (C. 0. A. 7th,
1926).
38 See supra note 6; also Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, supra note
19, at 161, 33 Sup. Ct. at 67.
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is put on the latter exception, for any variation in price is likely
to affect the competitive field of his purchasers and he will lay
himself open to litigation if he does not charge all members of a
class an equal price. It is believed that the rule allowing dis-
crimination in favor of chain stores is not affected. But where
two customers are both in one class, such as wholesalers, it will
hamper business appreciably if the manufacturer must treat one
exactly as he treats the other, unless "good faith" is made the
final touchstone. "To meet competition" may without difficulty
be extended to such a situation as that of the American Can Com-
pany, though in the instant case it appeared to have no competi-
tors.329 Moreover the case leaves the whole field of interpretation
of the other phrases of the provision untouched. For instance,
what is meant by "substantially" lessening competition, or "tend"
to create a monopoly? It is to be hoped the rule of "possible
evil," as exemplified in the recent TrentoL Potteries case,- will
not be extended here. If the scope of the instant case is not re-
stricted it is likely to mean the breaking down of the very free-
dom of competition it professes to protect.
In effect an enlargement of the scope of the statutes against
discrimination is an enlargement of governmental price control.
Price fixing may be necessary in the case of public utilities,
though its difficulty has added greatly to the burden of bureau-
cratic government. And some measure of price control may be
necessary when the public is interested in other ways, as when
there is an unscrupulous monopoly, or the business morale is
weakened by "unfair competition" in the strict sense of "fraud,
bad faith, deceit, or oppression." -' But to apply the principle
of price control to all commodities on all occasions, even to such
an extent as the recent case may allow, if not kept within bounds,
would seem to be a decided retrogression 2
In the Beechnut case, supra note 16, the manufacturer was held for
unfair competitive practices though it had no competitors. Any manufac-
turer who has a monopoly by patent must "meet" the competition of other
products. Cf. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,
supra note 2T; see Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. V.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 412, 31 Sup. Ct. 370, O0 (1911).
See also Fed. Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 423, 40 Sup. CL 572,
575 (1920) : "If a real competition is to continue the right of the individual
to exercise reasonable discretion in respect of his own businezs methods
must be preserved."
41 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. "77
(1927).
41 See Fed. Trade Comm. v. Gratz, supra note 39, at 427, 40 Sup. Ct. at
574; cf. Note (1924) 38 HARV. L. REV. 103, 106.
4-2 See Carver, Price Fixi2ig in Time of Peace (1919) 9 AM. Ecolz. REV.
SurP. 246, 247 (price fixing like lynching may be democratic, but it is not
liberal); see Justice Lamar, dissenting, in German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U. S. 389, 430, 34 Sup. Ct. 612, 626 (1914).
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"COMMON ENTERPRISE" IN THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
With the increase in automobile accidents, courts and lawyers
have more and more attempted to fashion a workable formula
of the "common enterprise." 1 Its chief application has been to
impute the contributory negligence of the driver of a car to an
individual accompanying him, in an action by the passenger
against the negligent driver of another car. It has occasionally
been invoked to thrust upon one personally guilty of no negli-
gence a vicarious responsibility for the faults of one associated
with him in a joint enterprise. No case has been found, how-
ever, which bars a recovery by the passenger against his driver
on the avowed ground of common enterprise. 2 Sometimes the
term is used to determine whether a plaintiff was under any
"duty" to use care on his own part. The result then, of course,
is an actual finding of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff himself.3 The formula of joint enterprise has been
adopted in most states, 4 including those which expressly repudi-
ate the doctrine of imputed negligence.5
1 "Parties cannot be said to be engaged in a joint enterprise within the
meaning of the law of negligence unless there be a community of interest
in the objects or purposes of the undertaking and an equal right to direct
and govern the movements and conduct of each other with reference thereto.
Each must have some voice to be heard in its control and management."
Cunningham v. Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 27, 86 N. W. 763, 765
(1901); see also Texas Traction Co. v. Woodall, 294 S. W. 873, 877 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927).
2 In some cases the application of the doctrine has been definitely repudi-
ated as having no bearing except as between one of the co-enterprisers
and a third party. Wilmes v. Fournier, 111 Misc. 9, 180 N. Y. Supp. 860
(Sup. Ct. 1920) ; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) ;
Harber v. Graham, 143 AtI. 340 (N. J. 1928). In others it has merely
been determined that the facts of the case did not create the relation. Of.
Albritton v. Hill, 190 N. C. 429, 130 S. E. 5 (1925); Jessup v. Davis, 115
Neb. 1, 211 N. W. 190 (1926); Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280
S. W. 32 (1926) (action by occupant of car against parent of driver);
Robinson v. Leonard, 100 Vt. 1, 134 Atl. 706 (1926); Labatte v. Lavalle,
155 N. E. 433 (Mass. 1927); Landry v. Hubert, 100 Vt. 268, 137 Atl. 97
(1927); Higgins v. Metzger, 143 Atl. 394 (Vt. 1928).
3 Cf. Davis v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 159 Fed. 10 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907);
Brommer v. Penn. R. R., 179 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910); Phila. &
Reading Ry. v. LeBarr, 265 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920).
4 The following jurisdictions at least do lip-service to the rule: Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the third,
fourth, eighth, and ninth circuits of the federal circuit courts of appeals.
5 C. P. & St. Louis Ry. v. Condon, 121 Ill. App. 440 (1905); Cincinnati
Traction Co. v. Hargrave, 2 Ohio App. 45 (1913); Anastasio v. Hedges,
207 App. Div. 406, 202 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1st Dep't 1923).
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An excellent example of its somewhat fortuitous development
is afforded by its history in Iowa. In Art-z v. Chicago, R. L & P.
R. R.,O decided in 1871, the plaintiff was driving his team of
horses on a road running parallel to the defendant's railroad
track, along which he had an uninterrupted view for some dis-
tance. In an action for injuries sustained in a crossing accident
with the defendant's locomotive, the court held as a matter of law
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In 1874,
in Payne v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R.,7 the court was presented
with a situation in which three companions were returning from
a trip to an adjoining village, in a wagon owned by none of them
and driven by another member of the party. The wagon was
struck by a train under physical circumstances similar to those
in the Artz case. In an action for personal injuries sustained
it was held that the Artz case controlled, and since the driver
was guilty of contributory negligence no recovery was allowed.
No mention was made of common enterprise and no discussion
undertaken of the imputation of the negligence. Not until Nisbct
v. Town of Garner," fourteen years later, was it explained that
"The holding in the [Poyne] case is not based upon the idea that
the relation of principal and agent existed between the plaintiff
and the person who was driving the team at the time, but rests
upon the fact that the parties were engaged in a common enter-
prise or purpose in which each to some extent was responsible
for the acts and conduct of the other." The doctrine today has
a firm foothold in that state.0
Varying bases fo; the doctrine have been advanced. In one
group of cases it is rested upon an agency between the parties; "
in another a differentiation is made between an agency and a
common enterprise; 11 and in yet another the analogy to a part-
nership is relied on. -1 2 The most frequent test is "control." This
634 Iowa 153 (1871)..
7 39 Iowa 523 (1874).
875 Iowa 314, 39 N. W. 516 (1888).
9 Wiley v. Dobbins, 204 Iowa 174, 214 N. W. 529 (1927).
20 Howe v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 91 Vt. 485, 101 Atl. 45 (1917) (no common
enterprise between parent and child, because for such each party must
be the agent of the other and a child of two and a half years is incapable
of such a relation); Kelley v. Hodge Transp. System, 197 Cal. 598, 242
Pac. 76 (1926); Farthing v. Hepinstall, 220 N. W. 708 (Mich. 1928).
. Cf. Labatte v. Lavalle, s2tpra note 2 (master and servant; action
between the two parties; no common enterprise); Louisville & N. Ry. v.
Armstrong, 127 Ky. 367, 105 S. W. 473 (1907) (master and servant);
McKernan v. Detroit Citizens' Street Ry., 138 Mlich. 519, 101 N. W. 812
(1904) ; Sylvester v. St. Paul City Ry., 153 Blinn. 516, 191 N. W. 40 (1922).
12 Fisher v. Johnson, 238 i1. App. 25 (1925) (neighbors alternately
driving each other to and from business held not to be engaged in a
common enterprise because the relation is based upon a "quasi-partner-
ship"); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Blinn. 304, 161 N. W. 715 (1917) (husband
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must consist of more than the mere privilege of selecting the
route.13 It must include an equal right of control by each party
over the other; 14 or control of the operation of the vehicle," or
control of the driver.16 But with possible exceptions where the
and wife with children on fishing trip; no common enterprise); see Note
(1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 676, 679.
13 Kelley v. Hodge Transp. System, supra note 10; HUDDY, AUTOMOBILES
(8th ed. 1927) § 811, and cases there cited.
14 In the following cases lack of such control prevented the situation
from being a common enterprise: North Texas Traction Co. v. Woodall,
supra note 1 (property owner gratuitously transporting employees of
building contractor working on his houses from one job to another);
Landry v. Hubert, supra note 2 (pleasure trip; suit between members);
Meyers v. Southern Pac. Co., 63 Cal. App. 164, 218 Pac. 284 (1923) (social
call); Chicago City Ry. v. Nonn, 133 Ill. App. 365 (1907); Cunningham v.
Thief River Falls, supra note 1.
13 In the following cases lack of equal right to control the operation of
the vehicle prevented the situation from being a common enterprise: Wren
v. Suburban Motor Tzansfer Co., 241 S. W. 464 (Mo. App. 1922) (car
driven by real estate salesman, plaintiff, a prospective buyer, was in the
rear seat returning from inspection of the house) ; Director Gen. of R. Rs.
v. Pence's Adm'x, 135 Va. 329, 116 S. E. 351 (1923) (plaintiff in front seat
of car operated by employee of jobbing concern; plaintiff was employee of
manufacturer and introducing new product to jobbers clientele); Koplitz
v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794 (1902) (plaintiff, a young
lady, riding in interior of horse-drawn bus, rented by young men for a
picnic); Bowley v. Duca, 80 N. H. 548, 120 Atl. 74 (1923) (plaintiff and
husband taking their children for an airing; husband driving; not shown
where plaintiff was riding); Barry v. Harding, 244 Mass. 588, 139 N. J-.
298 (1923) (plaintiff picked up on way to work by employee of garage test-
ing a repaired car; plaintiff in rear seat) ; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168,
223 Pac. 470 (1924) (plaintiff on joy ride on rear seat of motorcycle owned
by driver); Moore v. Almendinger, 15 Ohio App. 503 (1922) (plaintiff on
front seat of car on a fishing trip); Alperdt v. Paige, 140 Atl. 555 (Pa.
1928) (plaintiff on front seat of car on pleasure ride with husband).
In Kirkland v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 104 Kan. 388, 179 Pac. 362 (1919),
the plaintiff's decedent was instructing a new employee on a milk route. It
was not shown who was driving, but the court said that since from the
evidence the deceased must have had an equal or superior right of control,
he was engaged in a common enterprise so as to prevent recovery for his
death.
1o In the following cases lack of control over the driver in his operation
of the car prevented the situation from being a common enterprise: Wagner
v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174, 175 N. W. 840 (1920) (brother-in-law as guest
of driver on return from picnic) ; Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., 99 Vt. 280.
131 At]. 788 (1926) (young lady as guest of young man on return from
football game); Charlestown & W. C. Co. v. Alwong, 258 Fed. 297 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1919) (plaintiff was soldier riding on truck driven by a member
of another branch of the service); Stoker v. Tri-City Ry., 182 Iowa 1090,
165 N. W. 30 (1917) (plaintiff was ice cream salesman furnished with
truck and driver by employer; did not select his own driver); Kepler v.
Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 111 Neb. 274, 196 N. W. 161 (1925) (plaintiff
had been driven by brother to town to mail some letters).
In the following cases sufficient control over the driver was found to
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negligence consists in failing to slow down at a railroad crossing,
and a few like situations, it is difficult to perceive how a person
not actually driving the vehicle, even though he may possess all
three species of control, could, as a matter of fact, exercise any
effective dominion over its operation. Likewise the suggestion
that the common interest must exist not in the purpose for which
the trip is being taken, but in the operation of the car,17 although
logically satisfying would seem difficult to apply practically.
If the parties engaged in a trip share equally in the
expenses, the situation is considered one of common enterprise; 18
but the doctrine is not applied to the case of firemen riding upon
a fire truck.- With the exception of these two categories there
is irreconcilable confusion. The mere riding for pleasure does
not create a common enterprise.20 The relation of husband and
create a common enterprise: Langley v. Southern Ry., 113 S. C. 45, 101
S. E. 286 (1919) (plaintiff and husband driving guests to train; speed of
car increased at request of plaintiff; dissent on the ground that plaintiff
had no right of control); Masterson v. Leonard, 116 Wash. 551, 200 Pac.
820 (1921) (plaintiff, entrusted with father's bicycle, being ridden upon
the cross bar by another boy). In Wiley v. Dobbins, mspra note 9, the
plaintiff was a member of a family all of whom had contributed to the pur-
chase of a car. The entire family were being driven on a pleasure ride in
it by the fianc6 of plaintiff's sister. The court here found a common en-
terprise because no one had any special right of control.
It is interesting to note that the control test in its various applications
results more frequently in the rejection of the doctrine of common enterprise
than in its adoption.
17 In Moore v. Almendinger, supra note 15, the court decided that al-
though there might be a common purpose in a fishing trip there was none in
car-driving. It was found necessary to explain that the common enterprise
found in N. Y., Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Kistler, 66 Ohio St. 326, 64 N. E.
130 (1902) consisted in "listening." In that case a deaf father had tal:cn
his daughter with him upon a buggy ride to warn him of approach of the
trains. The action was by the daughter for personal injuries sustained in
a crossing accident with the defendant's locomotive.
1"Jensen v. Chicago Al. & St. P. Ry., 133 Wash. 208, 233 Pac. 635 (1925)
(parties returning from witnessing a prize fight) ; Beaucage v. Mercer, 206
Mlass. 492, 92 N. E. 774 (1910) (no evidence of purpose of trip) ; Adams
v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 52 N. E. 1068 (1899) (sharing of buggy hired for
pleasure trip made common enterprise for purpose of creating a vicarious
responsibility); see Griffiths v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 111 At. '00
(Pa. 1928) (three salesmen making their rounds togcther).
'9 Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521, 7 So. 666 (18S9); McBride v.
Des Moines City Ry., 134 Iowa 398, 109 N. W. 613 (1900); Donoghue v.
Holyoke Street Ry., 246 Mass. 485, 141 N. E. 278 (1923) ; Ring v. rMlinnea-
polis Street Ry., 173 Minn. 265, 217 N. W. 130 (1927) McKernan v. Detroit
Citizens' Street Ry., supra note 11.
20 Landry v. Hubert, supra note 2 (action between alleged co-enter-
prisers) ; Schwartz v. Johnson, supra note 2, sciable; Koplitz v. City of St.
Paul, supra note 15 (no contributory negligence imputed); Ronan v. J. G.
Turnbull Co., supra note 16, scmble; HuDDY, toe. cit. mtpra note 13. Con-
tra: Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60, 96 Atl. 334 (1916). This
YALE LAW JOURNAL
wife offers little assistance,21 as does that of family kinship.2
The cases are directly split upon whether a buyer and seller
riding together constitute common enterprisers.23  A hirer of a
livery coach is not engaged in a common enterprise with the
driver.24 The negligence of an employer may or may not, as a
common enterpriser, be imputed to an employee riding with him."
case has been severely criticized. Cf. Bowley v. Duca, supra note 15;
Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 174 Cal. 737, 164 Pac. 385 (1917).
In the following cases sufficient added facts made a common enterprise:
Washington & 0. D. Ry. v. Zell's Adm'x, 118 Va. 755, 88 S. E. 309 (1916)
(deceased and a friend accustomed to take trips together in a car owned
by friend; deceased in this instance got car from garage and planned the
trip; not shown who was driving); Jensen v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry.,
supra note 18 (expense sharing) ; Beaucage v. Mercer, supra note 18, sem-
ble; cf. Davis v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. Ry., supra note 3 (old friends; both
knew of dangerous crossing); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. LeBarr, supra
note 3; Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 3.
In Cullinan v. Tetrault, 123 Me. 302, 122 At]. 770 (1923), the negligence
of one buying poison instead of "checkerberry" to be used in making an
intoxicating drink -Was imputed to one who waited outside the drugstore.
21 No common enterprise: Stinson v. Maine Cent. Ry., 81 N. H. 473, 128
Atl. 562 (1995) (husband driving, he to attend business, plaintiff to buy
clothes for their children); Pettitt v. Kansas City, 267 S. W. 954 (Mo. App.
1925); Kokesh v. Price, supra note 12; Alperdt v. Paige, supra note 15;
Brubaker v. Iowa County, 174 Wis. 574, 183 N. W. 690 (1921); Bowley v.
Duca, supra note 15; Corn v. Kansas City C. & C. St. J. Ry., 228 S. W. 78
(Mo. 1921) (on way to meet daughter). Common enterprise was fouhd in:
Langley v. Southern Ry., supra note 16; Van Bergen v. Erie R. R., 70 Pa.
Super. 46 (1918) (driving wife's [plaintiff's] mother to railroad station;
wife also knew of dangerous crossing); of. Delaware and Hudson Co. v.
Boydon, 269 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921) (holding charge that husband
and wife on a fishing trip were engaged in a common enterprise was cor-
rect).
22 In the following cases there was held to be no common enterprise:
Farthing v. Hepinstall, supra note 10 (brother and sister); Chicago R.
I. & Gulf Ry. v. Johnson, 224 S. W. 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (sister-
in-law had been to aid in birth of brother-in-law's child; he was driving);
Kepler v. Chicago St. P. M. & 0. Ry., supra note 16; Howe v. Central Vt.
Ry., supra note 10; Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry., supra note 20 (mother and
son); see Barrett v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 190 Iowa 509, 521, 175 N. W.
950, 955 (1920) (father and son-in-law). Contra: Wiley v. Dobbins, supra
notes 9 and '16.
23 No common enterprise was found in: Wren v. Suburban Transfer Co.,
supra note 15 (real estate broker driving prospective purchaser to inspect
house); Sylvester v. St. Paul City Ry., supra note 11 (semble; property
owner driving)'. Common enterprise was found in: Southern Pac. Co. v.
Wright, 248 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (prospective purchaser of truck,
and seller's driver transporting buyer's goods therein for demonstration
purposes); Tannehill v. Kansas City C. & C. Ry., 229 Mo. 170, 213 S. W.
818 (1919) (arrived at by process of eliminating master and servant, prin-
cipal and agent, and guest relationships).
24 Cotton v. Willmar & Sioux Falls Ry., 99 Minn. 366, 109 N. W. 835
(1906).
25 Robertson v. United Fuel & Supply Co., 218 Mich. 271, 187 N. W. 300
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The same is true of co-employees,2G and it follows that a gra-
tuitous assistant is not necessarily a co-enterpriser.T
The courts are attempting to draw a definite line between
common enterprise and guest relationship, in which in absence of
statute there is no imputation of negligence.28 They are loath to
denominate a situation common enterprise, for they have not
been friendly toward the application of the doctrine.2 In fact,
it has been stated that the absence of special circumstances will
make the passenger a guest rather than a co-enterpriser.-3
There is more hesitance in allowing a third person to sue an
alleged "co-enterpriser" who was engaged in no operative neg-
ligence than in denying the co-enterpriser a cause of action
against a negligent third party.31
The doctrine of common enterprise has obviously not yet
reached a stage of crystallization.- For the purpose of the
(1922) (not so imputed); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Armstrong, supra note 11
(so imputed); cf. Labatte v. Lavalle, svpra note 2 (no common enterprise;
suit between parties).
2 No common enterprise: Baxter v. St. Louis Transit Co., 130 Mo. App.
597, 78 S. W. 70 (1903) (plaintiff delivering ice; companion drove wagon
and handed ice to him); Ohio City Ry. v. Nonn, 133 Ill. App. 365 (1907)
(helper to truck driver) ; Stoker v. Tri-City Ry., su pra note 16; Director-
Gen. of R. Rs. v. Pence's Adm'., supra note 15; Scheib v. N. Y. C. Ry., 115
App. Div. 578, 100 N. Y. Supp. 986 (2d Dep't 1906); Kansas City M. & 0.
Ry. v. Durrett, 187 S. W. 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); M Crotty v. B. & 0.
S. W. R. R., 229 Ill. App. 117 (1923). See also cases cited supra note 17.
A common enterprise was found in: Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Hanbury,
161 Ala. 358, 49 So. 467 (1909) (conductor and engineer on train) ; Hoff-
man v. Pittsburg & L. E. Ry., 278 Pa. 246, 122 Atl. 274 (1923) (both parties
working on ice wagon); Kirkland v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., mtpra note 15;
see Martin v. Puget Sound Elec. Ry., 136 Wash. 663, 241 Pac. 30 (1925)
(parties delivering lumber; plaintiff not driving but had alighted to rrpair
lights on the truck).
27 Schlomowitz v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 201 App. Div. 438, 194 N. Y. Supp.
520 (1st Dep't 1922) (three-to-two decision); Hines v. Welch, 229 S. W.
681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
28Cf. Pope v. Halpern, sulpra note 15; Withey v. Fowler Co., 104 Iowa
377, 145 N. W. 923 (1914) ; Barrett v. Chicago Mil. & St. Paul Ry., supra
note 22; Wagner v. Kloster, supra note 16; Albritton v. Hill, szprqa note 2;
Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co. supra note 16.
29 Cf. cases supra notes 14, 15 and 16.
30 Pusey v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 181 N. C. 137, 106 S. E. 452 (1922).
31 Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739 (1921).
32 This is evidenced by the fact that in absence of disputed facts the ques-
tion is for the court and not the jury. The courts as yet have not beun
able to fix a sufficiently accurate definition. Masterson v. Leonard, -upra
note 16; Barrett v. Chicago & St. P. Ry., supra note 22; Meyers v. Southern
Pac. Co., supra note 14; (reversing a submission of the question to the jury
based upon a standard dictionary definition). Contra: Ward v. Bleeds, 114
Minn. 18, 130 N. W. 2 (1911); Robison v. Oregon-Wash. R. & Nav. Co.,
90 Ore. 490, 176 Pac. 594 (1918); Nisb2tt v. Town of Garner, supra note 8
(seemingly overruled by the Barrett case supra). More often the court
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imputation of negligence, master and servant, principal and
agent, and partnership are all varying degrees of the same rela-
tionship. Common enterprise may include those situations which
do not readily fit into the classification of master and servant
and principal and agent, and yet do not reach the dignity of a
partnership33 The basis of the imputation of negligence here
may well be, as in a partnership, a common agency.3 4 It affords
a formula for situations which the court cannot readily classify
yet where the relation of the parties is such that the fault of
one seems justly to preclude recovery by the. other, or throw
upon him a vicarious responsibility for that fault; and it does
so without adverting to the much broader doctrine of Thorogood
v. Bryan.3'5 Despite the objection of want of predictability, in
the very flexibility of the formula lies its value.
passes thereon without consideration of whose province it is. Beaucago V.
Mercer, supra note 18; Director-Gen. of R. Rs. v. Pence's Adm'x, supra note
15; Baxter v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra note 26; Kirkland v. Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry., supra note 15; Southern Pac. Co. v. Wright, supra note 23;
Stinson v. Maine Cent. Ry., supra note 21; Koplitz v. City of St. Paul,
supra note 15.
33 The situation is obviously closely akin to the business relation of joint
adventures. See WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIoNS (1916) 6.
34 See MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) § 301.
35 8 C. B. 115 (C. P. 1849). The contributory negligence of an omnibus
driver was imputed to a passenger. Followed to its logical conclusion,
practically all negligence of the driver of a vehicle would be imputed to
his passenger. The case has been repudiated in England, and in this
country. See THOIPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF NEGLIGENCE (2d
ed. 1905 & Supp. 1914) §§ 499, 3067, 3069; (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 766.
